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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Bull'
(decided August 11, 2004)
Michele Bull, along with ten other defendants, was
convicted of loitering in violation of New York Penal Law Section
240.35 (4). Defendants argued that New York Penal Law section
240.35 (4), which prohibits groups from being disguised or masked
in public, infringed on their First Amendment 3 rights to anonymous
speech.' On appeal from the criminal court, the Supreme Court's
Appellate Term affirmed the conviction holding that Section
240.35 (4) does not infringe on any First Amendment rights to
anonymous speech.'
The incident for which defendants were convicted took
place at a May Day demonstration in Union Square Park.' The
784 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (McKinney 2005) which states:
Being masked or in any manner disguised by unusual or
unnatural attire or facial alteration, loiters, remains or
congregates in a public place with other persons so masked or
disguised, or knowingly permits or aids persons so masked or
disguised to congregate in a public place; except that such
conduct is not unlawful when it occurs in connection with a
masquerade party or like entertainment if, when such
entertainment is held in a city which has promulgated
regulations in connection with such affairs, permission is first
obtained from the police or other appropriate authorities.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I which states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or3
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
4 Bull, 784 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
5id.
6 Id. at 271.
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defendants, joined by others, assembled in a group, covered their
faces with bandanas, and shouted epithets and political slogans in
protest.7 These actions were clearly prohibited by Penal Law
Section 240.35 (4) which makes a person guilty of loitering when
that person congregates in a public place in a mask or disguise.'
The court relied upon Church of the American Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik,9 which held that New York's anti-mask
law was not enacted for the purpose of suppressing freedom of
expression, but rather, to aid the governmental interests of
deterring violence and apprehending wrongdoers."0 The American
Knights requested a parade permit to hold a demonstration on the
steps of the New York County Courthouse." After the police
department instructed the American Knights that they would
violate the statute if they wore masks, the Knights sought an
injunction for permission to demonstrate while wearing their
trademark masks."
The court in Kerik explained the history of the New York
anti-mask law to illustrate the necessity of the regulation. The law
arose during the "Anti-Rent era" which involved conflicts between
landlords and tenants of vast manorial estates in the years 1839 to
7 Id. at 271-72.
8 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4).
9 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
'o Id. at 205.
"Id. at 200.12 1d. at 200-01.
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1865.1" The legislation was deemed necessary for the prevention
and punishment of crime:
Some anti-renters formed bands of so-called
"Indians," disguised in calico gowns and leather
masks, who forcibly thwarted landlords' efforts to
serve farmers with process or to conduct distress
sales .. . .After [an] offense, or other and higher
crime has been perpetrated, the disguise is laid
aside, and even eye witnesses upon the spot, may
not be able to identify the guilty. 4
The court explained that the disclosure of the Knights
identity did not implicate their First Amendment rights even if a
member was less willing to participate in the demonstration as a
result."' Moreover, the court held that the right to anonymous
speech did not include a right to conceal one's identity. 6 "While
the First Amendment protects the rights of citizens to express their
viewpoints, however unpopular, it does not guarantee ideal
conditions for doing so . . . ." Therefore, the court held that the
right to anonymous speech was not even implicated because the
Knights still had an opportunity to express their views, although
the manner in which they communicated those views was altered
for the benefit of public safety. 8
"3 Id. at 203.
"' Kerik, 356 F.3d at 204.
'DId. at 209.
161d.
17id.
18 id.
2005]
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The Kerik decision was distinguished from that of NAACP
v. Alabama 9  where the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged a right to anonymous speech.2" The holdings of
NAACP and its progeny were not extended to permit the
concealment of a person's face while demonstrating because the
strong need for safety and regulation during such a potentially
dangerous situation outweighed the need for protection of the
demonstrators.2 Although it has been found that anonymity is
crucial in private or confidential circumstances, it is not as critical
for the expression of ideas as in People v. Bull and Kerik. The
court in Kerik explained this difference when it stated, "mask
wearing at entertainment events does not pose the same security
risks as mask wearing in other circumstances."22
In NAACP, the Attorney General of Alabama sought to
enjoin the NAACP in Alabama from conducting further activities
due to its failure to file its corporate charter with the Secretary of
State. 3 The State also moved for the production of documents,
including a list of the names and addresses of NAACP's
members.24 The NAACP failed to comply, claiming that Alabama
could not constitutionally compel disclosure.25
The Supreme Court agreed with the NAACP, holding that
the production order in-fringed on the members' right of
'9 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
20 Kerik, 356 F.3d at 208.
21 Id. at 209.
2 Id. at 210.
23 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451.
24 Id. at 453.
170 [Vol 2 1
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association. The Court recognized the importance of the freedom
to associate as well as the freedom of anonymity in one's
association.26 The Court stated:
[C]ompelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama
membership is likely to affect adversely the ability
of petitioner and its members to pursue their
collective effort to foster beliefs which they
admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may
induce members to withdraw from the Association
and dissuade others from joining it because of fear
of exposure of their beliefs shown through their
associations and of the consequences of this
exposure."
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation" held that requiring petitioner
circulators to wear identification badges stating their name and
status violated the First Amendment.29 The Court rejected the
argument that the badge served as a way for the public to identify,
and the State to detain petitioners who engaged in misconduct." In
addition to discouraging participation in the petition process, the
Supreme Court found that, "[t]he injury to speech is heightened for
the petition circulator because the badge requirement compels
personal name identification at the precise moment when the
circulator's interest in anonymity is greatest."3 Therefore, it found
25 Id. at 454.
26 Id. at 462.
27 Id. at 462-63.
28 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
29 Id. at 200.
30 Id. at 198.
31 Id. at 199.
2005]
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that this requirement acted as a restraint on communication and
was thus, invalid.32
Moreover, in the United States Supreme Court case,
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,33 the
Court found that the New York Public Service Commission
violated Consolidated Edison's First Amendment rights by limiting
the way it could express its viewpoint on an important
controversial issue.34 Consolidated Edison placed information
expressing its beliefs on the benefits of nuclear power inside the
monthly bills sent to its customers. The commission sought to bar
the company from distributing such information,35 but the Supreme
Court held that the restriction on bill inserts was unconstitutional in
that it prohibited Consolidated Edison from participating in an
important public debate.36
However, before the case of Consolidated Edison Co. went
up to the Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals had
already decided that restricting the billing inserts did not infringe
upon Consolidated Edison's First Amendment rights. 37 The Court
of Appeals reasoned that the New York Public Service
Commission prohibited only one means of expression, leaving
Consolidated Edison with an opportunity to convey its message by
32 Id. at 200.
3 447 U.S. 530 (1980).34 Id. at 533.
15 Id. at 532-33.
36 Id. at 535.
37 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 390 N.E.2d 749, 755 (N.Y.
1979).
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various other methods.3" The court further asserted that the
restriction was imposed for the benefit of utility consumers who
had no choice but to come in contact with the informational insert,
since it was mailed with the consumer's monthly bill.39 Therefore,
the court held that the ban was not only constitutional, but that it
supported an important governmental interest in protecting the
privacy rights of consumers.4"
In comparing the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech and that provided by the New York Constitution, the key
difference lies in the language of both. The New York State
Constitution expressly provides that, "[e]very citizen may freely
speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects," whereas
the First Amendment only restrains the government from making
laws "'abridging the freedom of speech.' "41 Thus, New York's
Constitution provides a right to freedom of speech, while the
Constitution of the United States only promises no interference
from the government respecting freedom of speech.
The scope of free speech protected under New York's
Constitution has been found to be broader than that protected under
federal law.42 "New York has a long history and tradition of
fostering freedom of expression, often tolerating and supporting
works which in other States would be found offensive to the
38 id.
39 id.
40 Id.
41 People v. Schrader, 617 N.Y.S.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).
42 People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494-95 (N.Y.
1986).
20051
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community. 43 However, the courts in New York, as well as the
United States Supreme Court, have never found that the right to
anonymous speech comprises a right to conceal one's appearance
or identity in a public display of expression." The right of
freedom of speech is always secondary to maintaining the safety
and health of the public; therefore, regulating the expression of
ideas which involves potentially dangerous conduct will not be
deemed unconstitutional when balanced against the governmental
interest in safety.45
Randi Schwartz
41 Id. at 494.
44 Kerik, 356 F.3d at 209.
45 Id.
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